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A 700-SEAT NO-LOSS COMPOSITION
FOR THE 2019 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
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Abstract. The following paper is part of the authors’ response to an invitation
from the Constitutional Affairs Committee (AFCO) of the European Parliament to
advise on mathematical methods for the allocation of Parliamentary seats between
the 27 Member States following the planned departure of the United Kingdom in
2019. The authors were requested to propose a method that respects the usual
conditions of EU law, and with the additional property that no Member State (other
than the UK) receives fewer that its 2014 allocation. This paper was delivered to
the AFCO on 21 August 2017, for consideration by the AFCO at its meeting in
Strasbourg on 11 September 2017.
Executive Summary. A composition for the 2019 EP is described obeying
the following criteria: (1) no Member State loses any seats; (2) degressive
proportionality is respected; and (3) the EP size is 700 seats. The allocation
grants five base seats to every Member State, plus one seat per 890 000
citizens or part thereof, except when: (i) the no-loss criterion (1) or the
degressivity criterion (2) warrants more seats, or (ii) the maximum capping
imposes 96 seats.
The approach extends to other EP sizes such as 701 seats (with allocation
key 888 600), or with 710 seats (allocation key 850 000).
Abstract. The No-Loss Cambridge Compromise is a pragmatic method
for the allocation of the seats of the 2019 European Parliament between the
EU27 Member States. It has the following properties: no Member State
loses any seat; it is objective and transparent, but not durable; it satisfies
degressive proportionality; it is fair subject to the requirements of no-loss
and degressivity; Parliament sizes as small as 700 or 710 seats may be
achieved; the least possible Parliament size is 694 with current data.
1. Introduction
In January 2017, the AFCO Committee organized a workshop on the composition
of the European Parliament (EP); see Grimmett et al. (2017). Various methods
were presented for the allocation of seats between the Member States, each respect-
ing degressive proportionality and satisfying the conditions of objectivity, fairness,
durability and transparency. The Cambridge Compromise of Grimmett et al. (2011)
may be used to achieve an EP of general size, while requiring transfers of seats
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between certain Member States. Other methods presented at the workshop per-
mit each Member State to retain its 2014 seats (no-loss solutions), while requiring
substantially more than 700 seats.
A more focussed question is the following. Is it possible to modify any of the
proposed methods, or to devise a new method, so that the following criteria are met:
(1) no Member State loses any seats;
(2) degressive proportionality is respected;
(3) the size of the EP is 700 seats, or 701 or 710 seats.
This note proposes a variant of the Cambridge Compromise that meets these criteria.
The variant is called the No-Loss Cambridge Compromise.
The No-Loss Cambridge Compromise operates in three stages. Stage A responds
to criterion (1), Stage B to criterion (2), and Stage C to criterion (3):
A. Allocate to each Member State its seat-count from the 2014 allocation. (For
EU27, this requires a total of 678 seats.)
B. Allocate a minimum number of further seats in order to achieve degressive
propor-tionality. The ensuing seat-totals are termed minimum restrictions.
(This requires a further 16 seats. There is no choice in their allocation.)
C. Allocate the remaining 6 seats to bring the total to 700, or the remaining 16
seats to bring the total to 710, using an adapted version of the Cambridge
Compromise
Stage A is dictated by the political requirement that no Member State loses seats.
Stage B is in response to the fact that the ensuing composition of the sitting EP fails
to be degressively proportional. Stages A and B bind 678 + 16 = 694 seats according
to current data. Stage C has only a few additional seats at its disposal to make up
the required total.
2. Assessment according to the criteria
The No-Loss Cambridge Compromise qualifies to be objective and transparent.
The issue of fairness is more nuanced, since several Member States enjoy protected
status at Stage B. The method is, however, fair provided the notion of fairness is
subordinated to criteria (1) and (2) above.
The method cannot claim to be durable. It is an ad hoc modification devised
for the incumbent parliament, and it will inevitably require modification for future
parliaments.
3. Determination of minimum restrictions (Stages A and B)
Table 1 exhibits the 27 Member States by decreasing population figures QMV2017.
The population figures are identical to those decreed for Councils Qualified Majority
Voting rule during the calendar year 2017; see European Council (2016). The status-
quo composition is displayed in column “2014”. Column “RR2014” contains the
representation ratios of the Member States. The representation ratio of a Member
State is defined as the quotient of its population figure and its 2014 seat allocation,
rounded to the nearest whole number.
A representation ratio that is larger than a ratio of a more populous predecessor-
state constitutes a breach of degressivity, and is marked by an asterisk (*).
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For instance, France is marked because its representation ratio is larger than that
of Germany (900 833 > 854 838). This is a breach of degressivity: France has a
smaller population than Germany, but a French deputy represents more citizens than
a German deputy. A breach of degressivity might be rectified by the retraction of a
suitable number of seats from the more populous state; this is, however, forbidden by
criterion (1). The other solution is to augment the total of the less populous state.
For France, four further “add-on” seats are required to attain a representation ratio
consistent with degressivity (854 636 < 854 838).
By the same argument, further seats are allocated to Spain (2), The Netherlands
(2), Sweden (1), Austria (1), Denmark (1) and Ireland (2).
The adjustment of Denmark and Ireland causes collateral breaches of degressivity
that are marked by a dagger (†). They are healed by add-on seats for Finland (1),
Slovakia (1) and Croatia (1).
A total of 16 “add-on” seats are brought to life, see Table 1. These are added
to the “2014” seats to yield the “2014DP” seats. The representation ratios for the
latter, as given in column “RR2014DP”, are decreasing and satisfy degressivity.
At Stage C, the degressively proportional seat allocation “2014DP” is passed into
the No-Loss Cambridge Compromise in the form of minimum restrictions.
4. The 700-Seat No-Loss Cambridge Compromise (Stage C)
We describe next the No-Loss Cambridge Compromise in the current setting. The
allocation proceeds in two steps. In the 2019 setting, the first step equips every
Member State with 5 base seats. This utilizes 27× 5 = 135 seats, and leaves 700−
135 = 565 seats available for the second step.
The second step invokes the ranges of seat-counts that submit to the Unions pri-
mary law and that obey the no-loss criterion (1) and the degressivity criterion (2).
Primary law demands that the seat allocation of a Member State lies between 6 and
96 seats. Criteria (1) and (2) raise the lower limit 6 to the new limit that is exhibited
in the “2014DP” column in Table 1. By setting aside the five base seats from the
first step, Table 2 exhibits the pertinent “Range” that needs to be observed by the
no-loss allocation.
Once the pertinent ranges have been identified, one executes the No-Loss Cam-
bridge Compromise. For the 2019 setting it operates as follows:
Every Member State is allocated five base seats, plus one seat per
890 000 citizens or part thereof, except when the minimum restriction
warrants more seats or the maximum capping imposes fewer seats.
In numerical terms, the population figure of a Member State is divided by the divisor
890 000. The emerging quotient is rounded upwards and increased by 5, in order
to account for the base seats. Let N designate the whole number thus obtained. If
N falls into the pertinent range (see above), then N signifies the seat allocation of
this state (France, Italy, Spain, and Slovenia till Malta). If N lies to the right of the
range then the allocation becomes 96 seats (Germany). If N lies to the left of the
range then the allocation is given by the applicable minimum restriction (Poland till
Lithuania). The key for this allocation rule is the divisor (890 000). The divisor is
determined so as to deal out exactly 700 seats.
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The No-Loss Cambridge Compromise results in the allocation labelled “2019” in
Table 2. Of the 700 seat total, 678 are bound in stage A by the no-loss criterion
(1), 16 are purposefully added in stage B due to the criterion of degressivity (2),
and 6 are submitted to the proper allocation process in Stage C. These six seats are
assigned to France (2), Italy (1), Spain (2) and Estonia (1).
Column “RR2019” confirms degressivity; the representation ratios are decreasing
when passing from a more populous state to a less populous state. The representation
ratio of a Member State is the quotient of its population figure and its 2019 seat
allocation, rounded to the nearest whole number.
One may contemplate the use of a different method in Stage C, such as one of
the procedures that were presented during the AFCO workshop or variants thereof.
However, in 2019 only six seats are available at stage C, whence we see no compelling
reason to employ a method more sophisticated than the No-Loss Cambridge Com-
promise. Allocations for future legislative periods of the EP will require a renewed
analysis. We emphasize the simplicity of the current proposal, and the clarity of its
three Stages in response to the three criteria.
5. Versions with 701 or 710 seats
Art. 14(2) of the Treaty of Lisbon (European Union, 2012), in its peculiar wording,
limits the size of the EP to 751 seats by saying that it shall not exceed seven hundred
and fifty in number, plus the President. When mimicking this format, a size of 700
seats might be paraphrased as six hundred and ninety-nine in number, plus the
President.
In a similar vein one may choose an EP of size seven hundred in number, plus the
President. Then the total EP size would be an odd number: 701. The 701st seat
would be allocated to France, with allocation key lowered to 888 600.
The No-Loss Cambridge Compromise can be applied to any parliament size of 694
or more, with current data. For a parliament of size 710 the allocation key would
turn out to be 850 000 (no table included). The ten additional seats beyond 700
would increase the allocations of France (4), Italy (4) and Spain (2). This solution,
also, satisfies degressivity.
However, a parliament of size much beyond 700 seats sends a different political
message to the public and the media. A particular figure such as 710 would call
for justification, and may underline a perception that the prime aim of the sitting
parliament is to defend their incumbent mandates. In contrast, a 700 seat total
is easily remembered, and conveys a more powerful message of efficiency and self-
restraint.
6. The role of rounding in degressive proportionality
The No-Loss Cambridge Compromise has a non-standard relationship with the
specification of degressive proportionality in Art. 1 of the European Council (2013)
decision:
The principle of degressive proportionality shall require decreasing rep-
resentation ratios when passing from a more populous Member State
to a less populous Member State, where the representation ratio of a
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Member State is defined to be the ratio of its population figure relative
to its number of seats before rounding.
First of all this definition cannot be applied literally to the 2014 composition in Table
1 since no rounding is taking place.
Nor can the definition be applied literally to Table 2. The reason is that for 18
Member States (Germany, and Poland till Lithuania) the seat numbers are achieved
by restriction to given ranges, and they involve no rounding step. The other nine
Member States allow a distinction between before rounding and after rounding. How-
ever, the version before rounding does not interact seamlessly with the 18 Member
States just mentioned: Slovenia’s index 2 064 188/7.3 = 282 765 would surpass
Lithuania’s 262 596, thus indicating a breach of degressivity.
Therefore the version after rounding is applied throughout. It transpires well in
the 2019 setting with current data.
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Table 1. Augmentation of the 2014 EP composition to achieve degressivity
Notes:
Representation ratio “RR2014” of status quo “2014” seats:
The representation ratios “RR2014” are the quotient of a Member State’s “QMV2017”
population figure and its “2014” seat allocation, rounded to the nearest whole num-
ber. A representation ratio that is larger than one of its more populous predeces-
sors constitutes a breach of degressivity, and is marked by an asterisk (*) or, when
implied by previous corrections, by a dagger (†).
Representation ratio “RR2014DP” of “2014DP” seats:
The “Add-on” seats are added to the “2014” seats in order for the resulting
“2014DP” seats to achieve degressivity. The representation ratios “RR2014DP”
are the quotient of the “QMV2017” population figures and the “2014DP” seats,
rounded to the nearest whole number. These representation ratios are decreasing
when passing from a more populous Member State to a less populous Member
State.
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Table 2. No-Loss Cambridge Compromise for a 2019 EP with 700 seats
Notes:
No-Loss Cambridge Compromise “2019”:
Every Member State is allocated 5 base seats, plus one seat per 890,000 citizens
or part thereof, except when the minimum restriction warrants more seats (Poland
till Lithuania) or the maximum capping imposes fewer seats (Germany).
Range specification:
The “Range” of feasible seat-counts is composed of 5 base seats plus at least a
minimum number of seats so as to reach the “2014DP” seats in Table 1, and at
most a maximum number of 91 seats so as to respect the capping at 96 seats.
Allocation key:
The divisor (890 000) is determined so that exactly 700 seats are dealt out.
Verification of degressive proportionality:
The representation ratios “RR2019” are the quotients of the “QMV2017” popula-
tion figures and the “2019” seat allocations, rounded to the nearest whole number.
These representation ratios are decreasing when passing from a more populous
Member State to a less populous Member State.
Column “Diff.” exhibits deviations of proposed “2019” seats from status quo “2014” seats.
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